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Abstract: We estimate the e®ects of past self-employment experience on
subsequent earnings in wage work using the population of Danish citizens be-
tween 16 and 65 years of age that we observe between 1980 and 1996. Specif-
ically, we analyze how the e®ects of previous self-employment experience are
a®ected by age, success in self-employment and the employment status prior
to self-employment. We also take a long-term perspective and test whether
wage-e®ects of self-employment are nonlinear and if they depreciate over
time. We ¯nd that an additional year of self-employment experience reduces
subsequent wage earnings by 4.7%-8.2% compared to continued wage-work
experience. Young and successful formerly self-employed bene¯t, however,
from their self-employment experience. Moreover, formerly self-employed
who were non-employed or unemployed prior to their self-employment expe-
rience receive only slightly lower wages than individuals that never entered
self-employment. We also ¯nd that the negative self-employment e®ects de-
crease with longer spells of self-employment and that they depreciate over
time in subsequent wage work.
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The promotion of self-employment, often termed \entrepreneurship", ranks
high on the agenda of policy makers all over the world. The economic con-
sequences of self-employment to society are regarded as being substantial in
terms of job creation, innovation and growth. Thus, many policy initiatives
aim at inducing more wage workers to become self-employed. While societal
bene¯ts from self-employment are undisputed, it is less clear what the pri-
vate economic value is for individuals who become self-employed. Perhaps
equally important, what is the value of self-employment experience if the
self-employed later returns to wage work? This is the main question which
this paper seeks to answer. In order to do so, we estimate the e®ects of
past self-employment experience on subsequent earnings in wage work using
the population of Danish citizens between 16 and 65 years of age observed
between 1980 and 1996.
Estimating the consequences of previous self-employment on subsequent
wages in dependent employment is important since self-employment spells
are typically short. In Denmark, for example, 84.8% of all self-employment
spells end within ¯ve years, a pattern that also persists in the US (Bruce and
Schuetze, 2004) and Germany.1
From a theoretical point of view, it is not at all clear whether experience
from self-employment is more or less valuable than continued wage work
experience, and the few empirical studies in this area arrive at divergent
conclusions. Are skills acquired less rapidly in self-employment or are they
perhaps less useful in subsequent wage work? Does self-employment serve as
a means of signaling ability to prospective employers? If the latter is true, we
may expect the e®ects of self-employment to depend on the \success" in self-
employment as well as the age of the individual and the occupational status
of the individual prior to self-employment, as signalling is most important for
young and un-/non-employed workers.2 Moreover, the e®ects of previous self-
employment on dependent work wages may be transitory. Thus, the overall
or average e®ects of self-employment experience on wage employment wages
may lump together a wide array of divergent e®ects. This paper attempts to
sort out these divergencies.
We employ a data set that is particularly rich both in terms of information
on workforce members and the number of workforce members it covers. The
1Calculations based on the German Socio Economic Panel show that, dependent on
the cohort, between 54% and 60% of all self-employment spells end within ¯ve years. We
thank Michaela Niefert for performing these calculations for us.
2We de¯ne non-employed workers as those who temporarily leave the work force for
example in order to take a sabbatical year or to go on parental leave.
1richness of our data allows us to perform a much more detailed, precise (in
terms of parameter identi¯cation) and disaggregate analysis than the existing
studies in this area. Our analyzes are performed on register data of the entire
population of Danish citizens. The data contains annual observations on
work status as well as detailed information on the individuals' background
characteristics like education and job market experience.
Focusing on individuals who were wage employed both at the beginning
and the end of a ¯ve-year window, we ¯nd that self-employment within that
window has a signi¯cantly negative e®ect on subsequent wage earnings com-
pared to continued wage work. This e®ect is, however, much less negative
than the consequences of unemployment and non-employment spells. Specif-
ically, we ¯nd that one year of self-employment reduces subsequent wage
earnings by 4.7% to 8.2% compared to a situation with continued wage
work. This result is robust to corrections for potential endogeneity of the
self-employment experience as well as the non-random selection of individu-
als back into wage employment after a spell of self-employment.
A closer and more di®erentiated look at the returns to self-employment in
subsequent wage-employment reveals that the reduction in wages is most se-
vere for older and unsuccessful previously self-employed workers. In fact, suc-
cessful former self-employed earn more in dependent employment than con-
secutively wage-employed. By contrast, older and unsuccessful self-employed
incur reductions in later wage employment wages of 11.5% per year of pre-
vious self-employment experience. This is a strong indication that the sig-
nalling value of self-employment plays an important role for the wage return
in subsequent dependent employment. This is also supported by our ¯nd-
ing that individuals who were unemployed or non-employed before entering
self-employment do not incur a similar reduction in dependent employment
wages as individuals who were previously wage-employed.
Once we allow for non-linear e®ects of self-employment experience, we
¯nd that the negative e®ects of self-employment become relatively smaller in
magnitude for longer spells of self-employment. Furthermore, negative e®ects
of previous self-employment spells gradually wear o® after several years of
subsequent wage employment. Thus, negative e®ects of self-employment ex-
perience on dependent employment wages are typically associated with short
spells and have transitory e®ects only.
Related empirical studies we are aware of contain rather mixed results
and su®er from imprecise estimates due to relatively small sample sizes. As
probably the ¯rst study in this area, Evans and Leighton (1989) ¯nd no clear
evidence of a di®erent return to previous self-employment experience com-
pared to previous wage work experience in the US. Ferber and Waldfogel
(1998) use a US sample of both self-employed and wage employed individ-
2uals and ¯nd a negative e®ect of self-employment experience from an unin-
corporated business when controlling for current self-employment, which in
itself has a positive e®ect on returns. Using the same data set, Williams
(2000) ¯nds that the e®ect of self-employment experience on current wages
is smaller than the e®ect of wage-work experience, but only signi¯cantly so
for women. In a later study, Williams (2002) estimates the wage return to
previous wage-work and self-employment experience on German data and
¯nds that self-employment experience yields a lower return in wage employ-
ment than continued wage-employment experience. This result is shared by
a recent study by Niefert (2006). Finally, Bruce and Schuetze (2004) ¯nd
that brief spells of self-employment do not increase, and in some of their
speci¯cations signi¯cantly decrease, subsequent wage earnings compared to
continued wage work for a sample of US workers.
Our results con¯rm that self-employment experience in general is valued
less than continued wage work experience by subsequent employers. More im-
portantly, however, our study points at substantial di®erences in the returns
to self-employment that depend on the success, the age, the occupational
status prior to self-employment and the length of the self-employment spell.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the
empirical framework. Section 3 introduces the data and Section 4 presents
estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Framework
2.1 Theoretical background
This section presents the empirical model that forms the basis of our es-
timations. We then move on to discuss potential endogeneity and sample
selection problems associated with the estimation of this model.
The theoretical literature explains the value of job market experience
(and education) for wages by: (i) the accumulation of skills or, more gen-
erally, human capital (Becker, 1975; Mincer, 1974), and (ii) its signalling
value (Spence, 1973). Before that background, a di®erent return to self-
employment experience compared to wage-work experience may re°ect: (a)
that skills are acquired more or less rapidly in self-employment or are more or
less useful in subsequent wage work and (b) that a spell of self-employment
serves as a signal to future employers which is di®erent from that of continued
wage-employment.
If signalling plays an important role for the value of self-employment ex-
perience in dependent employment, we expect both individual-speci¯c char-
3acteristics like age and performance in self-employment to play a role as well
as the situation prior to the self-employment spell. We empirically test for
the presence of these e®ects.
2.2 Empirical Speci¯cation
Our focus in this paper is on the consequences of experiencing relatively brief
spells of self-employment in subsequent wage-employment. For this reason,
we select only those individuals from the population who were wage employed
at both the beginning and the end of a ¿-years time window, i.e. in years
T ¡ ¿ and T.
This allows us to compare the e®ects of self-employment on wages in
year T of (i) staying in wage work throughout the time window and (ii)
experiencing one or more years of self-employment between T ¡¿ and T. In
this regard, we follow the approach taken by Bruce and Schuetze (2004).
Thus, our basic equation of interest is:
ln(wiT) = ¯xiT + °E[T ¡ ¿;T]iT + "iT; (1)
where the dependent variable, ln(wiT), is the natural logarithm of individual
i's hourly wage in year T (which is 1996 in our case)3, and xiT is a vector
of individual characteristics. It consists of dummy variables for educational
length, age, tenure, gender, region, industry a±liation, marital status and
number of children in 1996. In some speci¯cations, the vector xiT also con-
tains the natural logarithm of individual i's wage in year T ¡¿, the beginning
of the time window considered.
The coe±cients of main interest are the elements of °. They measure the
e®ects of di®erent types of experience on dependent employment wages in
T. They are related to a vector of experience variables E that measure the
cumulated experience of individual i obtained between T ¡¿ and T. Finally,
the term "iT denotes an idiosyncratic error term and is to be interpreted
as unobserved (to the econometrician and possibly to the employer) worker
ability.
Equation (1) is estimated separately for men and women. Most of the
paper focuses on the estimation results for men since we are neither able
to accurately predict women's choice of becoming self-employed nor their
self-selection back into wage employment at the end of the time window
3Our data basically extends up to 2003. However, since Denmark abolished wealth
taxes in 1997, information on wealth is only available up to 1996. We use wealth as an
exclusion restriction for self-selection back into wage-employment at T ¡ ¿ and T which
is why we cannot consider a longer time horizon.
4considered, at least given the variables at our disposal. We do summarize
the results for women, however, in Subsection 4.2.
Models 1 to 5, to be presented below, consider short time windows of
¯ve years where T ¡ ¿ = 1990 and T = 1996. Experience in these models
hence is accumulated between 1991 and 1995 which corresponds to ¯ve years
of working experience. The time window is then extended to ten years of
experience with T ¡ ¿ = 1985 and T = 1996 in Model 6 and Model 7.4
Model 1: self{employment dummy variable
In our baseline speci¯cation, E[:] is a dummy variable, denoted SEi96, that
is coded 1 (and 0 otherwise) if individual i encountered a period of self-
employment between 1990 and 1996 (both periods excluded).
Model 2: years of self-employment experience
Model 1 does not take into account the length of the self-employment spell of
individual i. Model 2 therefore distinguishes between the years of experience
from four types of occupations: wage-employment, self-employment, non-







i96 denote the years of self-employment experience,
non-employment experience and unemployment experience, respectively, that
individual i accumulated between 1990 and 1996.
Experience in wage employment is left out in the estimations since it is
perfectly multicollinear with the other experience terms. The coe±cients
related to E[.] are therefore to be interpreted as deviations from the re-
turns to wage-employment experience. Note that Model 2 is, apart from the
additional occupational status of non-employment, identical to the model
estimated by Bruce and Schuetze (2004).
Model 3: success in self{employment
Model 3 attempts to di®erentiate the e®ects of a \successful" self-employment
experience from those of an \unsuccessful" one. We de¯ne \success" as
the average number of persons employed by individual i during his self-
employment spell. The distribution of the number of employees is almost
discrete since 19.9% of the formerly self-employed did not have any employ-
ees, 67.8% had between one and two employees and 12.3% had more than
two employees. The average number of employees during self-employment is
4If we were in possession of the necessary data, we would certainly be interested in
estimating the e®ects of voluntary vs. involuntary exits from self-employment. While
our data accurately measure employment status at a particular point in time each year,
they remain uninformative with respect to an individual's employment history within that
year. This data restriction prevents us from de¯ning involuntary exists by, e.g., a spell of
unemployment following the spell of self-employment. We therefore leave an analysis of
this for future research.
51.2, the median is 1. We therefore distinguish between formerly self-employed
with 0 employees (the \unsuccessful"), 1-2 employees, and 3 or more employ-




i96, respectively. Unsuccessful self-employed serve as the ref-
erence group and we interact the success dummy variables with experience in









Model 4: age of the self-employed
If the most important e®ect of self-employment experience is the signalling
value, then individual i's age at the beginning of his self-employment spell
should be an important determinant of subsequent wages in dependent em-
ployment, as signalling will be most important for young workers. To analyze
age e®ects, we interact cumulated self-employment experience with dummy
variables for the age of the individual in 1996. We de¯ne four age groups: 22
to 35 years of age, 36 to 44 years of age, 45 to 50 years of age and above 50







i , using the fourth as the reference group.














Model 5: transitions into self-employment
The signalling value of self-employment may also depend on the job market
status in the period prior to self-employment. As for the young workers, an
unemployed (or non-employed) worker who becomes self-employed may ben-
e¯t more from the signalling value of self-employment than a wage-employed
individual. In fact, previously non-employed or unemployed may use self-
employment as a way back into wage employment.
We distinguish two di®erent transitions into self-employment, those from
non-employment and those from unemployment. The corresponding dummy




i . Thus, the omitted cat-
egory is transitions directly from wage-employment into self-employment.












Model 6: non-linear speci¯cation
Model 1 to Model 5 all consider only up to 5 years of self-employment ex-
perience. In Models 6 and 7, we extend our time window to ten years of
experience, i.e. T ¡ ¿ = 1985 and T = 1996. We do so in order to al-
low self-employment experience to have a non-linear e®ect on subsequent
wages in dependent employment. On the one hand, if the signalling e®ect
6of self-employment is more important than the pure human capital accu-
mulation e®ect, then short spells of self-employment may be su±cient to
reap the positive bene¯ts of self-employment. On the other hand, if it
takes more time to accumulate human capital in self-employment than in
wage-employment, the formerly self-employed fare better with longer self-
employment spells. It is an empirical question which e®ect dominates and
in order to sort out the two e®ects, we assume quadratic e®ects of self-









Model 7: consecutive wage-employment
The extent to which self-employment experience matters for subsequent wage-
employment is likely to depend on how long an individual has been wage-
employed after the completion of a self-employment spell. Model 7 therefore
estimates the e®ect of self-employment experience for individuals that have
been consecutively wage-employed for ¯ve years following a self-employment
spell. Such long-run e®ects may be more positive than the short run impacts,
either because it takes time for the employer (or employee) to utilize the skills
acquired in self-employment or because the importance of the loss of wage
employment skills during self-employment depreciates. We therefore analyze
the e®ects of experience for individuals who have been consecutively wage-
employed at least since 1991. Thus, we analyze the e®ects of self-employment
experience accumulated between 1985 and 1991 on wage-employment wages
in 1996 for individuals who were consecutively wage-employed since 1991.
Denoting self-employment, non-employment and unemployment experience
in this period by Expse
i91, Expne
i91, Expue
i91, we use the following experience





Estimation of our models of interest is associated with two identi¯cation
problems: (i) endogeneity of self-employment experience and (ii) sample se-
lection.
Endogeneity of self-employment experience
The experience measures on the right hand side are likely to be endogenous
since the idiosyncratic error, "iT, may contain unobserved individual ability
which in°uences not only wages but also occupational choice. This may
for example be the case if occupation is (partly) determined by expected
earnings. In that case, cumulated experience, E[:], is correlated with the
error term, "iT, and the coe±cient estimate ° becomes inconsistent.
7We address this problem in two di®erent ways. Following Williams (2000)
as well as Bruce and Schuetze (2004), we include individual i's initial wage,
the wage at the beginning of the time window as an additional regressor. It
serves as proxy variable for unobserved ability. Including initial wage solves
the endogeneity problem if (and only if) the initial wage of individual i is a
su±cient statistic for the unobserved ability component.
Our second approach is to instrument self-employment experience using
data on wealth and experience of family members, much like Hamilton (2000).
We thereby follow an approach applied by Kaiser (2002), who derives a two-
stage linear regression model with a dummy{endogenous variable. The ¯rst
stage is a \reduced form" probit model for the endogenous variable, self-
employment experience, that is regressed on the exogenous variables and the
exclusion restrictions. The second stage is an OLS wage rate regression that
includes a correction term that is obtained from the probit estimates.
This procedure is only applied for Model 1, the model where self-employment
experience is a simple dummy variable. Appendix A explains the estimation
procedure and displays estimation results for the probit model. It shows that
our instruments are highly correlated with selection into self-employment.
They hence ful¯ll one of the two criteria for an instrument to be valid. The
other one is that the instruments are orthogonal to the error term of the
equation of interest. We shall comment on that property below.
Instrumenting years of experience is much more challenging since years
of experience is a discrete ordered variable. We are unable to ¯nd suitable
instruments for such a model that not only is ordered but also requires dif-
ferent instruments for di®erent types of occupational experiences. Hence,
instrumentation is not applied in Model 2 to Model 7. We rely on including
initial wage as an additional regress
We prefer not to explore the time series dimension of our data but to
stick to the cross-sectional models described above. It is commonplace to use
¯xed e®ects or di®erence{in{di®erence (DID) estimation techniques to deal
with the problem of unobserved individual ability. Even though tempting,
¯xed e®ects or DID may not be the ¯rst choice here since (i) our model
is of a cross-sectional nature and (ii) identi¯cation in both FE and DID
models stems from variation in variables within observations. The within
variation of the experience variable is moderate, however, most importantly
since 95% of all individuals encounter zero periods of self employment and
since self-employment spells typically last for just one year. Furthermore,
¯xed e®ects estimation requires strict exogeneity of the regressors which is
clearly questionable in our case as discussed above.
Sample selection
8Our population of interest consists of individuals wage employed in both the
initial period (1985 or 1990) and the ¯nal period (1996). We restrict attention
to workers wage-employed employed at T ¡¿ since these are the individuals
that many economic policy initiatives encourage to become self-employed.5
We do not attempt to correct for selection back into wage-employment in T ¡
¿, but we correct for sample selection problems arising from non-random exits
from this group, i.e. into alternative occupations in 1996 (self-employment,
non-employment or unemployment). Hence, all estimation results we present
correspond to individuals who were wage-employed in 1990 (or 1985) and
1996, and while we do not correct for selection back into our data in 1990
(or 1985), we do correct for selection into our data in 1996.
The sample selection problem | the non-random selection back into wage
employment in 1996 in Model 2 to Model 6 and the non-random selection
into consecutive wage-employment in Model 7 | is handled in the standard
way by including the inverse Mill's ratio in the wage regression. The inverse
Mill's ratio, a correction term for sample selection, is calculated from a pro-
bit model for selection back into wage employment in 1996 (given that the
individual was wage employed in the initial period). We again use informa-
tion on past occupation of parents and the spouse as well as family wealth
as exclusion restrictions. Appendix B displays ¯rst stage probit estimation
results and explains how the exclusion restrictions are operationalized. The
Appendix shows that our exclusion restrictions are statistically highly signif-
icant predictors of individual i's choice of being wage-employed in 1996.
We do not distinguish between di®erent types of exists from wage-employment
in 1996 do to a lack of instrumental variables that separately determine these
alternative choices. To check the robustness of our results, however, we re-
stricted the alternative choice to be exit into self-employment in 1996. Our
estimation results remain very robust to this alternative speci¯cation.
Appendix A and Appendix B also present tests for overidentifying re-
strictions. The corresponding test statistics are calculated as the number of
observations times the uncentered R2 of a regression of the residuals from
the wage regression on the exogenous variables and the instruments. Even
though the uncentered R2 is always smaller than 0.01 for the instruments for
selection into self-employment between T ¡ ¿ and T and smaller than 0.04
for selection back into wage{employment at T, we cannot accept orthogonal-
ity for any of our models. This is due to the high number of observations.
5Economic policy has only recently been directed towards the unemployed, encouraging
them to start their own businesses, as discussed by, e.g., Pfei®er and Reize (2000). Further-
more, considering initially unemployed workers would, introduce substantial heterogeneity
and lead to additional identi¯cation problems.
9In order to check the robustness of our regressions with respect to instru-
ment choice, we additionally estimated models that used restricted sets of
instruments. Our estimation results for men are very robust to these sensi-
tivity analyzes. They do change, however, substantially for women, which
is another reasons why we do not present estimation results for women in
detail.
3 Data
The data we use in this study come from the Integrated Data Base for Labour
Market Research (\IDA") compiled by Statistics Denmark. It contains reg-
ister data on all individuals with Danish residence since 1980. The data
base provides detailed information on experience in di®erent occupations,
hourly wages, a wide range of other individual-speci¯c characteristics like
educational background as well as family and spouse characteristics.
The total number of individuals in the data is three million. After drop-
ping immigrants from the sample since some variables, most importantly
education, are poorly measured for this group,6 we are left with around 1.8
million individuals (men and women) who were full-time wage employed in
both the initial and the ¯nal period. The number of observations used in our
regressions is, however, lower due to missing values for some of the explana-
tory variables and, even more so, for the instruments.
We discard individuals who work in the agricultural or the defense sector
from our analyzes to be consistent with existing studies.
Job occupations are categorized according to individual i's primary labor
market status in the last week of November.7 We are hence unable to control
for °ows between labor market states within a year. Furthermore, we do
not include individuals with part-time self-employment. Hourly wages are
measured in Danish Kroners.8
Note that the Danish labor market is characterized by a high degree of
°exibility, as ¯ring costs are extremely low in comparison to other continental
6To give an example, the authors of this paper hold Master degrees in Economics from
Germany and the UK, respectively. In the Danish system, however, both degrees are
registered as Bachelor degrees.
7We could alternatively use a de¯nition based on income, such that an individual is
classi¯ed as self-employed if her self-employment income is strictly positive and exceed
her earnings in wage employment. This would, however, tend to exacerbate the sample
selection problems, as the observed labor market status would then be correlated with the
individual \success" in that state.
8The Euro/Danish Kroner exchange rate is about 1:7.5 (7.5 Danish Crowns for 1 Euro).
10European countries. In that vein, Denmark compares better to US and UK
labor markets than to the labor markets of the larger European countries.
At the same time, the Danish welfare state takes care of the unemployed
through, for example, particularly high compensation rates which is why the
Danish model is often termed \Flexicurity" | a combination of °exibility
and social security (Andersen and Svarer, 2006). On the other hand, the
Danish wage structure is very compressed which may push some workers
into self-employment as they cannot qualify for the institutionalized wages
as argued by Malchow-M¿ller et al. (2005). These factors may well a®ect
observed transition patterns between di®erent occupational states.
Our empirical analysis starts by looking at transition patterns between
di®erent occupations to get an idea about the magnitude of °ows between
di®erent labor market states. Table 1 shows that 94.5% of all individuals who
were wage-employed in 1990 were also wage employed in 1996. Furthermore,
2.7% (21,669) of these individuals experienced a spell of self-employment of at
least one period. The average self-employment experience of those formerly
self-employed is 1.2 years, the median is 1 year.
Table 1 also considers all those individuals who moved from wage-employment
to self-employment between 1990 and 1991, i.e. they were wage-employed
in 1990 but self-employed in 1991. Of those, 78.1% were back in wage-
employment in 1992 and 84.8% had returned to wage-employment by 1995.
The share of those who leave self-employment is even larger when longer time
horizons are considered.
[Insert Table 1 about here!]
Table 2 contains summary statistics of the variables used in the regres-
sions. The ¯gures in the table correspond to males who were wage employed
both in 1990 and 1996. The values are of 1990, the beginning of our time
window. Table 2 hence contains information on those individuals \at risk"
of becoming self-employed in the time window 1991 to 1995.
The variable \Tenure" corresponds to the number of years spent in the
current job. We measure education by seven dummies variables that repre-
sent the individual's years of schooling. Eight years of schooling is the base
category in the estimations that follow. \Married" is a dummy variable for
the individual being married, \# of children" is the number of children below
18 years of age. To control for geographical di®erences, we use three dummy
variables (the \greater" Copenhagen area, other \cities" and \rural" areas).
Individuals from the greater Copenhagen are our comparison group. Our
11estimations include seven sector dummy variables. The dummy variable for
employment in the public sector is omitted in the regressions.
Table 2 shows that the typical (future) self-employed has, compared to
individuals who did not encounter a period of self-employment, a substan-
tially lower tenure, has a longer education, is more likely to be married, has
more children, lives in an urban area outside the greater Copenhagen area
and is much less likely to work in the public sector, in manufacturing, energy
and construction. He is more likely to work in Retail trade, Transport as
well as Banking and ¯nance.
Individuals who became self-employed in the years between 1990 and
1996 earned higher hourly wages in 1990 than those that did not become
self-employed. The di®erence in hourly wages is 14.2% and possibly re°ects
di®erences in education.
The ¯gures in Appendix C refer to 1996 but otherwise contain the same
information as Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 about here!]
4 Results
4.1 Main results
The tables presented in this section only contain the estimates of the param-
eters of the experience variables and the associated test statistics. A full set
of estimation results for Model 1 and Model 2 are displayed in Appendix D.9
Model 1: self{employment dummy variable
Table 3 presents estimates of the parameters of interest for Model 1. Column
(1) of Table 3 shows that self-employment experience reduces subsequent
wages for men by 7.5%. Adding initial wage, i.e. hourly wage in 1990, to the
regressors to proxy for unobserved ability di®erences of the individuals as in
Column (2), increases the reduction in subsequent wages to 8.5%. The fact
that the estimate becomes more negative once initial hourly wage is included
indicates that individuals with higher unobserved ability choose a spell of
self-employment.
Column (3) addresses the potential endogeneity of self-employment expe-
rience in an alternative way, namely by instrumenting the dummy variable
9All other estimation results, including those for women, can be downloaded from URL
not to be disclosed due to author anonymity requirement.
12for self-employment experience using measures of family wealth and prior
occupational experience of parents and spouse (see Appendix A for details).
As when using the proxy for unobserved ability, instrumentation increases
the wage reduction compared to the base model in Column (1), this time
to 11.4%. The coe±cient on the correction term, which is constructed from
the ¯rst-stage reduced form probit regression, is positive and highly signi¯-
cant which also indicates that endogeneity matters and that the most able
individuals, in terms of unobserved ability, have at least one spell of self-
employment.
Apart from indicating that a spell of self-employment has a negative im-
pact on subsequent wage-employment wages, Table 3 contains another im-
portant result that we draw upon in the remainder of the paper: including
initial wage as a control variable for unobserved individual ability leads to
rather similar results as when using instrumental-variables techniques. That
makes us con¯dent that including initial hourly wage as a control variable for
unobserved individual ability in Model 2 to Model 7 leads to estimation re-
sults that do not su®er much from endogeneity problems. Given the evidence
provided by Table 3 we do, however, believe that if our estimation results
are biased, they are biased towards zero and hence provide a lower limit of
the actual e®ects of self-employment experience on wages in subsequent wage
employment.
[Insert Table 3 about here!]
Model 2: years of self-employment experience
Table 4 shows estimation results for Model 2 that uses years of self-employment,
non-employment and unemployment experience as our measures for E[:].
The estimated experience coe±cients are to be interpreted relative to wage-
employment experience, Column (1) and Column (2) of Table 4 show that
an additional year of self-employment reduces subsequent earnings as a wage
worker by between 4.7% and 5% compared to an additional year of wage-
employment, depending on whether or not we control for unobserved ability
by including initial hourly wage. These results are well in line with those of
Table 3 given that the average length of a self-employment spell in our data is
1.2 years. For comparison, an additional year of unemployment reduces sub-
sequent wages by between 7.3% and 7.9% while the e®ects of non-employment
are as large between 17.2% and 20.9%.
As in Table 3, including the initial wage in the set of regressors increases
the magnitude of the coe±cient estimate on years of self-employment expe-
rience. Again, this indicates that the most capable individuals, those with
13a large unobserved ability, are those that choose spells of self-employment.
Similarly, we ¯nd signs of negative selection into a period of non-employment
or unemployment, as these estimates become less negative when including
initial hourly wage.
Column (3) and Column (4) of Table 4 present estimation results for mod-
els where we control for the non-random selection back into wage employment
in 1996 by including the inverse Mill's ratio, denoted by \Correction term"
in the table, as a correction for sample selection.10 Correcting for sample
selection does a®ect our parameter estimates. The e®ect of an additional
year of self-employment is now found to reduce subsequent earnings by 7.5%
if initial hourly wage is not included, and by 8.2% if it is included.11
[Insert Table 4 about here!]
The estimation results of Model 2 indicate a wage loss due to self-employment
experience that ranges from 4.7% in the simplest speci¯cation to 8.2% in our
preferred speci¯cation that controls for unobserved heterogeneity by includ-
ing initial hourly wage and sample selection. For comparison, Bruce and
Schuetze (2004) ¯nd that an additional year of self-employment experience
reduces the post-self-employment wage by between 3.0% and 15.6% com-
pared to a year of additional wage-work experience.12 Our results hence
indicate somewhat less negative consequences of self-employment, and they
also appear to be more precisely (in terms of standard deviations) estimated.
Another di®erence of our results compared to those of Bruce and Schuetze
(2004) is that their estimates become smaller in magnitude (and less signif-
icant) when they control for initial wage. They hence ¯nd that the less
able individuals encounter self-employment spells. We ¯nd the opposite phe-
nomenon which may re°ect a higher degree of wage compression in the Danish
10The coe±cient on the inverse Mill's ratio is positive and statistically highly signi¯cant.
This indicates positive selection back into wage-employment in 1996. I.e. the least able
individuals (in terms of unobserved ability) of those wage-employed in 1990 tend to leave
the sample for either unemployment, non-employment or self-employment in 1996. Much
of this is likely to be due to retirements of elderly or marginalized workers.
11One potential problem with the sample selection correction is that information about
the experience of parents is only available for individuals born after 1962. For older
workers, the values of these variables are therefore (somewhat arbitrarily) normalized to
zero. To analyze the importance of this, we ran the regressions using di®erent subsets
of the exclusion restrictions, e.g., using only measures of wealth (which are observed for
everybody) as exclusion restrictions. The results turned out to be very robust to these
alternatives.
12Bruce and Schuetze (2004) estimate that an additional year of unemployment is asso-
ciated with a wage reduction of between 8.2% and 55.7% relative to a year of continued
wage employment.
14labor markets and most likely in most other continental European labor mar-
kets. Wage compression increases the incentives for more able individuals to
engage in self-employment as shown by Malchow-M¿ller et al. (2005).13
Model 3: success in self{employment
Column (1) of Table 5 displays estimation results for Model 3 where self-
employment experience is interacted with two dummies for how many jobs
the formerly self-employed created. All results in Table 5 are for regres-
sions with initial hourly wage included and where it is corrected for sample
selection.
The estimation results show that the number of employees of a formerly
self-employed have a quite dramatic e®ects on subsequent wages. We esti-
mate disreturns to self-employment experience of 8.9% per year for formerly
self-employed without any employees. By contrast, formerly self-employed
with 1 to 2 employees receive a net positive e®ect, while the e®ect for formerly
self-employed with 3 or more employees is insigni¯cant.
In sum, success in self-employment appears to be extremely important
for later returns in wage-employment. One interpretation for the importance
of success as a self-employed is that having had employed workers during the
self-employment spell is a positive (and veri¯able) quality signal to future
employers.
[Insert Table 5 about here!]
Model 4: age of the self-employed
Column (2) of Table 5 includes results from interaction of self-employment
experience with age dummies. The estimation results show that while indi-
viduals above 50 years (the comparison group) of age incur negative returns
of 11.5% per year from self-employment experience compared to continued
wage-work experience, the net e®ect for individuals below 35 years of age is
close to 0 (but still statistically signi¯cantly negative). Slightly larger nega-
tive e®ects of self-employment are found for the other age groups considered
in the estimations.
These results provide additional evidence for signalling e®ects to be present.
While there is no reason to believe that why skills should be accumulated
13Finally, Bruce and Schuetze (2004) undertake an alternative regression where they
only use those individuals who also experienced a job change in wage employment as the
comparison group, as the job change in itself might a®ect wages negatively. This tends
to make their results insigni¯cant { possibly due to the substantially reduced sample size.
We include tenure in current job to take into account such job change e®ects.
15at a di®erent pace by young and old workers in self-employment, we expect
young and inexperienced workers to bene¯t more from signalling their ability
through a spell of self-employment. These workers have much less previous
labor market experience that could serve as an alternative signal.
Model 5: transitions into self-employment
In Column (3) of Table 5, self-employment experience is interacted with
dummies for the occupational status before entering self-employment.
The estimation results indicate that an individual's occupational status
before his transition into self-employment has an important e®ect on subse-
quent wages in dependent employment. While switchers from wage employ-
ment to self-employment receive a 5.9% lower wage than individuals that
remain in wage-employment, individuals who switch from unemployment or
non-employment into self-employment receive a wage that is between 3.2%
and 3.8% lower than the wage received by those who stayed in wage employ-
ment.14 Hence, previously unemployed or non-employed bene¯t relatively
more from a spell of self-employment. This is again consistent with a sig-
nalling e®ect of self-employment.
In sum, Model 3 to Model 5 all add to a picture of self-employment
experience serving as a signal for future employers, as the positive e®ects are
most pronounced for successful workers (where the signal is indeed positive)
and for those in need of a signal (the young and unemployed).
Model 6: non-linear speci¯cation Model 1 to Model 5 only considered
¯ve-years windows of experience. Model 6 and Model 7 expand the time
window to ten years. The corresponding estimation results are displayed in
Table 6 and Table 7 below.
Table 6 shows estimation results from Model 6 where we account for
quadratic e®ects of experience in subsequent dependent employment wages.
The results indicate that one year of self-employment is associated with a sub-
sequent wage reduction of between 5.9% and 6.1%. This is in line with the
estimation results of Model 2. However, the e®ect of the second year in self-
employment is less negative than the e®ect of the ¯rst year. Thus, the neg-
ative e®ects are maximizal at 2.6 years of self-employment experience where
they amount to -9.7%. Furthermore, 5.2 or more years of self-employment
experience are now associated with a positive e®ect on subsequent wages
compared to continued wage employment.
14These individuals also receive negative e®ects of the non-employment or non-
employment spell which implies that the \pure" self-employment e®ect is actually even
smaller.
16The result that the negative e®ects of self-employment experience on sub-
sequent wage-employment diminish at some point can be explained by the
time it takes to acquire useful skills in self-employment that are valuable to
later wage-employment, like leadership skills. An alternative explanation is
that longer spells are typically \successful" periods of self-employment which
are associated with a higher signalling value of self-employment.
The results of Table 6 are very robust to the inclusion of initial hourly
wage and the correction term for sample selection.
[Insert Table 6 about here!]
Model 7: consecutive wage-employment While longer spells of self-
employment are associated with less negative consequences, another rele-
vant long-run issue is whether there are negative e®ects of previous self-
employment experience after ¯ve years of consecutive wage employment. The
e®ect of self-employment may be negative in the ¯rst few years after an in-
dividual returns to wage employment, but the individual may later start to
catch up.
Table 7 shows that the negative e®ect of self-employment experience on
subsequent dependent employment wages disappear or, depending on the
speci¯cation, decreases to -1.7% per year after 5 years of consecutive wage
employment. This estimate is, however, hardly signi¯cant given sample size.
Thus, this con¯rms that the negative e®ects of self-employment are to a large
degree transitory.
In sum, the results of Model 6 and Model 7 show that (i) e®ects of longer
spells of self-employment are less negative than the e®ects of short spells and
(ii) the e®ects of self-employment experience are mostly transitory.
[Insert Table 7 about here!]
4.2 Results for Women
The estimates for women are in general much less signi¯cant than for men,
and the instruments used for the self-employment dummy in Model 1 as well
as for the sample selection correction in all models were much weaker in
terms of predictive power.
The coe±cient corresponding to the self-employment dummy in Model
1 is estimated to be -2.9%, which is reduced to -2.5% once initial hourly
wage is included. Similarly, in Model 2, the e®ect of self-employment ex-
perience is found to be -1.5% per year. This e®ect is reduced to -1.4%
17when initial hourly wage is included. Thus, women appear to be less ad-
versely a®ected by self-employment spells than men. The same holds for
non-employment and unemployment spells. Furthermore, the fact that the
e®ect of a self-employment spell becomes (slightly) less negative after the
inclusion of initial hourly wage points to negative (if any) selection into a
spell of self-employment for women, contrary to what we ¯nd for men.
The point estimates for the models with interactions, Model 3 to Model 5
are mostly insigni¯cant. We do not ¯nd non-linear e®ects in Model 6. The ef-
fects of self-employment experience for those consecutively wage employment
for ¯ve years (Model 7) are, similar to those obtained for men, statistically
insigni¯cant.
5 Conclusion
This paper estimates the e®ects of past self-employment experience on sub-
sequent earnings in wage work using the population of Danish citizens be-
tween 16 and 65 years of age. While we ¯nd that an additional year of
self-employment experience reduces subsequent wage earnings by 4.7%-8.2%
compared to continued wage-work experience, a ¯nding that is in line with
previous studies in this area. The purpose of this paper has been to explore
this overall e®ect in greater detail.
Speci¯cally, we ¯nd that young, successful and previously unemployed
(or non-employed) workers actually bene¯t from (or are at least not harmed
by) a spell of self-employment, while older, less successful and previously
wage-employed workers su®er signi¯cantly more from a period of a self-
employment. All this points to an important signalling e®ect of self-employment,
as the positive e®ects are most pronounced for successful workers and for
those in need of an ability signal, i.e. young and unemployed workers.
Furthermore, our long-run estimations show that the initially negative
e®ects of self-employment are to a large extent transitory, as the e®ects de-
crease with longer spells of self-employment and depreciate over time in sub-
sequent wage work.
Our results thus underscore that there are divergent forces at work that
determine the overall negative e®ect of self-employment on subsequent wages
in dependent employment. In other words: self-employment is not always a
bad experience. This paper investigated some of these divergent forces but
much work remains to be done if we are to fully understand the consequences
of self-employment spells for those that return to dependent employment.
The most interesting, perhaps, would be to analyze the e®ects of involuntary
exits from self-employment.
18Table 1: Transitions from wage-employment to self-employment (men only)
Share (%)/Mean Absolute #
Individuals w-e in 90 and 96 94.5 852,953
Only individuals w-e in 90 and 96
Individuals w/ spell of s-e 2.7 21,669
Average s-e duration 1.2 |
Median s-e duration 1.0 |
Only individuals w-e in 90 (no conditioning on w-e in 96)
Share s-e between 90 and 96 5.1 43,482
W-e in 90, s-e in 91, w-e in 92 78.1 11,211
W-e in 90, s-e in 91-92, w-e in 93 3.0 434
W-e in 90, s-e in 91-93, w-e in 94 2.0 292
W-e in 90, s-e in 91-94, w-e in 95 1.7 242
Total 84.8 12,179
Table 1 displays main characteristics of our data regarding self-employment (\s-e") du-
ration and transitions between self-employment and wage-employment (\w-e"). Reading
example for the lower panel of the table: 78.1% of the individuals who were wage-employed
in 1990 and who became self-employed in 1991 were back in wage-employment in 1992.
The remaining 21.9% were either still self-employed, non-employed or unemployed in 1992.
19Table 2: Descriptive statistics
All W/o s-e exp. W/ s-e exp.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Di®erence
ln(hourly wage in 1990) 5.116 0.401 5.109 0.397 5.242 0.453 -0.133
ln(hourly wage in 1996) 5.212 0.352 5.208 0.353 5.354 0.261 -0.146
Tenure 4.139 3.720 4.253 3.742 1.961 2.385 2.292
Age 37.525 10.042 37.452 10.021 38.924 10.337 -1.472
Education
8 years 0.107 | 0.111 | 0.038 | 0.073
9 years 0.048 | 0.049 | 0.031 | 0.018
10 years 0.065 | 0.067 | 0.035 | 0.032
12 years 0.556 | 0.555 | 0.578 | -0.022
14 years 0.023 | 0.024 | 0.012 | 0.012
16 years 0.134 | 0.133 | 0.158 | -0.025
18-20 years 0.066 | 0.061 | 0.149 | -0.088
Family status
Married 0.574 | 0.561 | 0.811 | -0.249
# of children 0.775 0.944 0.755 0.339 1.162 0.364 -0.407
Geographical variables
Copenhagen 0.469 | 0.479 | 0.268 | 0.212
Rural 0.208 | 0.212 | 0.117 | 0.095
City 0.324 | 0.308 | 0.615 | -0.307
Sector
Public 0.248 | 0.257 | 0.075 | 0.182
Manufacturing 0.181 | 0.186 | 0.075 | 0.111
Energy 0.012 | 0.012 | 0.001 | 0.011
Construction 0.122 | 0.126 | 0.050 | 0.076
Retail & wholesale trade 0.187 | 0.179 | 0.341 | -0.162
Transport 0.141 | 0.134 | 0.282 | -0.148
Banking & ¯nance 0.110 | 0.106 | 0.177 | -0.071
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimations. All
variables correspond to 1990. Di®erences between individuals with at least one spell of
self-employment (column \W/ se exp.") and without self-employment experience (column
\W/o se exp.") are statistically highly signi¯cant at any signi¯cance level. Ranksum
tests are used for the binary variables and unpaired t-tests with unequal variances are
used for the continuous variables.
20Table 3: Model 1, self{employment dummy variable
(1) (2) (3)
Base model Initial hourly wage IV model
Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value
Self-employ- -0.075 -38.20 -0.085 -40.12 -0.114 -33.23
ment dummy
Initial hourly wage | | 0.476 386.42 | |
Correction term | | | 0.025 10.21
Adj. R2 0.354 0.526 0.354
Table 3 displays OLS estimates for Model 1. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedas-
ticity. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly wages. The coe±cients
on the experience variables hence translate into changes in hourly wages due to a change
in experience by one year.
Table 4: Model 2, years of experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial hourly wage
Base model Initial hourly wage Selection & selection
Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value
Expse -0.047 -26.12 -0.050 -26.97 -0.075 -34.80 -0.082 -36.20
Expne -0.079 -98.92 -0.073 -100.91 -0.085 -105.47 -0.079 -107.35
Expue -0.209 -116.97 -0.172 -95.12 -0.203 -107.52 -0.170 -88.12
Initial hourly wage | | 0.458 373.07 | | 0.462 368.92
Correction term | | | | 0.090 25.68 0.101 29.48
Adj. R2 0.403 0.561 0.395 0.554
Table 4 displays OLS estimates for Model 2. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedas-
ticity. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly wages. The coe±cients
on the experience variables hence translate into changes in hourly wages due to a change
in experience by one year.
21Table 5: Model 3 { Model 5, interaction with success, age and transition
(1) (2) (3)
Success Age Transition
Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value
Expse -0.089 -37.52 -0.115 -35.79 -0.059 -30.60
Expse ¢ S1¡2 0.184 44.18 | | | |
Expse ¢ S>2 0.081 7.45 | | | |
Expse ¢ A22¡35 | | 0.105 24.55 | |
Expse ¢ A36¡44 | | 0.098 15.82 | |
Expse ¢ A45¡50 | | 0.102 16.25 | |
Expse ¢ TNE¡SE | | | | 0.020 5.48
Expse ¢ TUE¡SE | | | | 0.027 3.86
Expne -0.077 -105.50 -0.077 -105.39 -0.077 -105.57
Expue -0.176 -96.02 -0.176 -95.37 -0.176 -95.72
Sum of coe±cients
Sum p{val. Sum p{val. Sum p{val.
Expse + Expse ¢ S1¡2 0.095 0.00 | | | |
Expse + Expse ¢ S>2 -0.008 0.44 | | | |
Expse + Expse ¢ A22¡35 | | -0.011 0.00 | |
Expse + Expse ¢ A36¡44 | | -0.018 0.00 | |
Expse + Expse ¢ A45¡50 | | -0.013 0.01 | |
Expse + Expse ¢ TNE¡SE | | | | -0.038 0.00
Expse + Expse ¢ TUE¡SE | | | | -0.032 0.00
Initial hourly wage, correction term and adj. R2
Initial hourly wage 0.471 396.91 0.470 381.37 0.504 396.28
Correction term 0.108 10.12 0.109 31.22 0.036 9.98
Adj. R2 0.567 0.565 0.540
Table 5 displays OLS estimates for Model 3 to Model 5. Standard errors are robust to
heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly wages. The
coe±cients on the experience variables hence translate into changes in hourly wages due
to a change in experience by one year.
22Table 6: Model 6, non-linear speci¯cation, 10-years window
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial hourly wage
Base model Initial hourly wage Selection & selection
Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value
Expse -0.074 -28.41 -0.078 -27.32 -0.073 -27.87 -0.075 -28.10
(Expse)2 0.015 13.92 0.016 13.96 0.014 13.39 0.014 13.80
Expne -0.135 -87.95 -0.127 -83.54 -0.149 -95.95 -0.148 -95.41
(Expne)2 0.024 46.53 0.022 43.18 0.026 49.32 0.025 49.14
Expue -0.275 -100.98 -0.222 -81.47 -0.259 -86.51 -0.260 -86.22
(Expue)2 0.038 37.45 0.032 30.22 0.036 34.69 0.036 34.67
Minimum e®ect on wages reached (in years):
Self-employment 2.533 2.383 2.650 2.588
Non-employment 2.830 2.925 2.919 2.913
Unemployment 3.571 3.506 3.615 3.613
Initial hourly wage | | 0.279 182.28 | | 0.282 182.26
Correction term | | | | 0.048 15.98 0.037 12.24
Adj. R2 0.416 0.476 0.400 0.464
Table 6 displays OLS estimates of Model 6. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedas-
ticity. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly wages.
23Table 7: Model 7, consecutive wage-employment
(1) (2) (3)
Initial hourly wage
Base model Initial hourly wage & selection
Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value
Expse 0.008
¤ 2.32 -0.000## -0.05 -0.017 -4.72
Expne -0.100 -67.02 -0.072 -48.86 -0.099 -64.98
Expue -0.048 -23.53 -0.009 -3.88 -0.022 -9.02
Initial hourly wage | | 0.315 190.37 0.314 187.57
Correction term | | | | 0.234 97.06
Adj. R2 0.387 0.467 0.474
Table 7 displays OLS estimates for Model 2. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedas-
ticity. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly wages. The coe±cients
on the experience variables hence translates into changes in hourly wages due to a
change in experience by one year. The superscripts \*" indicate that the corresponding
coe±cient is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the ¯ve percent marginal signi¯cance
level, the superscript \**" indicates that the corresponding coe±cient is statistically
insigni¯cant.
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26Appendix A: the dummy endogenous variable
model
The model
This Appendix describes the dummy endogenous variable model applied in
the estimation of the e®ect of self-employment experience on subsequent
wages in dependent employment. The corresponding estimation results are
displayed in Table 3, Column 3.
Let Di denote a dummy variable that is coded 1 if individual i encountered
a period of self-employment between 1990 and 1996. We assume that the
individual chooses self-employment if a corresponding latent variable, D¤
i, is
larger than 0. One can think of D¤
i as re°ecting the di®erence between the
bene¯ts of self-employment and the associated opportunity cost. Selection




i = zi± + ºi > 0
0 otherwise; (2)
where zi is a vector of variables that determine individual i's choice of self-
employment. It consists of both variables that a®ect wages, xi, and \exclu-
sion restrictions", variables that we assume are related to the self-employment
decision but are unrelated to wages. Equation (2) hence is in \reduced form".
Our dependent variable, the natural logarithm of hourly wages, is a func-
tion of experience and other control variables, summarized by vector xi and
the dummy variable for self-employment experience:
ln(wi) = ¯xi + °Di + "i (3)
The disturbance terms ºi and "i are bivariate IID normally distributed
with mean zero and covariance matrix ­ whose o®-diagonal element is ½ and
whose elements on the diagonal are ¾º and ¾". Note that:










´ = ¡½¾"¸i (4)
and that










´ = ½¾"¹i (5)
The wage equation accounting for endogeneity is then:
ln(wi) = ¯xi + cDi + ½¾"i
³
¹iDi ¡ ¸i(1 ¡ Di)
´
+ "i (6)
27We estimate equation (6) by a two-step procedure. We ¯rst estimate Equa-
tion 2 by a probit model and calculate the correction terms ¸i and ¹i. We
then estimate Equation (6) by OLS. The parameter c is the causal e®ect
of self-employment on wages. In other words, it is that \average treatment
e®ect" which in the present case coincides with the \average treatment e®ect
on the treated".
Exclusion restrictions
Identi¯cation of our dummy endogenous variable model hinges upon the
choice of our exclusion restrictions. We use two sets of exclusion restric-
tions: (i) family wealth as well as (ii) spouse, mother and father experience
in di®erent occupations.
We argue that family wealth is unrelated to an individual's unobserved
ability but highly positively correlated with an individual's choice of becom-
ing self-employed. Family wealth may serve as initial funding of a startup
and may serve as a bu®er once the business starts running.
Likewise, we believe that occupational experience of parents and the
spouse are important determinants of selection into self-employment but
are uncorrelated with an individual's unobserved ability. For example, self-
employment experience by parents will a®ect children's choice since they ex-
perienced the pros and cons of being self-employed and may even have learned
how to run a business. Similarly, spouse experience in self-employment also
goes along with learning.
The family wealth variable is operationalized by four dummy variables
that represent the four quantiles of the wealth distribution. The fourth
quantile, the most wealthy families, serves as the comparison group in our
estimations.
Parent and spouse experience is operationalized as the cumulated years
of experience since 1980 (or the year of entry into the data) and until the
beginning of the time window (T ¡ ¿) in (i) self-employment, (ii) wage-
employment, (iii) unemployment and (iv) non-employment.
For an exclusion restriction to be valid it must ful¯ll two requirement: (i)
it must be uncorrelated with the error term of the equation of interest and
it must be (ii) highly correlated with the endogenous variable.
Property (i) is tested using tests for over-identifying restrictions where
the test statistic is based on an auxiliary regression of the residuals from
the equation of interest, Equation (6), on the instruments and the exoge-
nous variables, vector zi. The test statistic for the test for over-identiying
restrictions is the uncentered R2 of that regression times the number of ob-
servations. It is Â2
k distributed with the degrees of freedom, k, being equal
to the number of exclusion restrictions. The test statistics we obtain reject
28instrument validity at any conventional signi¯cance level which is unsurpris-
ing given the large number of observations. We therefore use subsets of our
instruments to check if our estimation results are a®ected by reducing the set
of exclusion restrictions. Our results are very stable with respect to changes
in the instrumentation.
Property (ii) is tested by tests of joint and separate signi¯cance of the ex-
clusion restrictions. The table below displays \¯rst stage" regression results
and shows that our exclusion restrictions indeed are important determinants
of selection into self-employment given the large t-statistics of the individual
instruments and the large Likelihood ratio test statistics for joint signi¯cance.
Note that the estimation results in general con¯rm the picture from the
descriptive statistics in Table 2: individuals who encounter a spell of self-
employment tend to have more education, are more likely to be married and
have more children. Furthermore, self-employment experience is more likely
in cities outside Copenhagen and is positively in°uenced by the local unem-
ployment rate. With respect to our instruments, we observe that individuals
in the highest and lowest wealth quartiles are more likely to experience a
spell of self-employment.









9 years 0.656*** 22.26
10 years 0.692*** 25.01
12 years 0.544** 28.59
14 years 0.801*** 25.69
16 years 1.265*** 63.43
18-20 years 1.706*** 81.38
Family status
Married 0.370*** 27.80
# of children 0.386*** 75.42
Geographical variables







Retail & wholesale trade 1.061*** 71.85
Transport 0.953*** 62.27
Banking & ¯nance 0.700*** 47.89
Instruments
Family wealth in 0%{25% quantile -0.102 -2.90
Family wealth in 25%{50% quantile -0.625*** -17.21
Family wealth in 50%{75% quantile -0.902*** -26.06
Spouse self-employment experience 0.057*** 13.79
Spouse wage-employment experience -0.061*** -42.13
Spouse non-employment experience -0.184*** -32.68
Spouse unemployment experience 0.036*** 21.05
Mother self-employment experience -0.060*** -13.64
Mother wage-employment experience -0.041*** -14.89
Mother non-employment experience -0.094*** -13.94
Mother unemployment experience -0.064*** -23.71
Father self-employment experience 0.020*** 7.71
Father wage-employment experience -0.021*** -10.24
Father non-employment experience -0.046*** -6.84
Father unemployment experience -0.013*** -4.00
Constant -4.415*** -40.06






Family status 7,665 0.00
Geography 3,392 0.00
Sector 7,171 0.00
All instruments 17,236 0.00
Family wealth 3,805 0.00
Spouse experience 4,809 0.00
Mother experience 690 0.00
Father experience 539 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.4065
The Table displays ¯rst stage reduced form probit regression estimates for an individual's
decision to switch into self-employment between 1990 and 1996. The asteriks \***" and
\**" indicate marginal signi¯cance at the one percent and ¯ve percent level.
30Appendix B: the selection model
Selection into wage-employment in both T and T ¡¿ is handled in the stan-
dard way by including the inverse Mill's ratio in the wage equation. We
choose the same instruments as for the dummy endogenous variables model
described in Appendix A since variables that a®ect the choice of becoming
self-employed will also a®ect the choice of returning to wage-employment,
with a di®erent sign, however.
The table below shows \¯rst stage" estimation results of a probit model
for selection back into wage-employment in 1996 (year T). It corresponds to
our baseline model, Model 2. The table shows that our exclusion restrictions
are important determinants of selection back into wage-employment in 1996
given the large t-statistics of the individual instruments and the large Wald
test statistics for joint signi¯cance.
From the table we observe that those most likely to leave our sample are
older and more experienced workers with a relatively low education. They
tend to live in cities outside Copenhagen, are unmarried and have fewer
children below the age of 18. Furthermore, individuals in the highest wealth
quartile are more likely to leave the sample.
31First stage probit results for wage-employment in 1990 and 1996
Coe®. t-val.
Experience prior to 1990
WE-exp. prior tp 1990 0.086*** 30.53
NE-exp. prior to 1990 0.326*** 65.68








9 years -0.047*** -19.28
10 years -0.371*** -24.64
12 years -0.191*** -18.48
14 years 0.059** 2.23
16 years 0.388*** 23.60
18-20 years 0.137*** 7.58
Family status
Married -0.358*** -38.85
# of children -0.078*** -18.91
Geographical variables







Retail & wholesale trade -0.816*** -76.67
Transport -0.750*** -69.08
Banking & ¯nance -0.350*** -25.09
Instruments
Family wealth in 0%{25% quantile 0.775*** 24.83
Family wealth in 25%{50% quantile 1.471*** 45.78
Family wealth in 50%{75% quantile 0.807*** 26.04
Spouse self-employment experience 0.048*** 15.23
Spouse wage-employment experience 0.058*** 68.23
Spouse non-employment experience -0.107*** -49.54
Spouse unemployment experience 0.040*** 32.60
Mother self-employment experience -0.064*** -17.82
Mother wage-employment experience -0.090*** -35.77
Mother non-employment experience 0.066*** 13.30
Mother unemployment experience -0.018*** -7.19
Father self-employment experience -0.061*** -31.49
Father wage-employment experience -0.027*** -16.57
Father non-employment experience 0.028*** 6.89
Father unemployment experience -0.134*** -72.56
Constant 2.115*** 19.26
Likelihood ratio tests for joint signi¯cance and pseudo R2
Test stat. p-val.
Speci¯cation 75,473 0.00
Experience 5,428 0.00 Tenure 7,699 0.00
Age 493 0.00
Education 2,821 0.00
Family status 3,187 0.00
Geography 6,496 0.00
Sector 7,675 0.00
All instruments 39,420 0.00
Family wealth 5,075 0.00
Spouse experience 8,142 0.00
Mother experience 5,135 0.00
Father experience 7,095 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.3510
The Table displays probit regression estimates for the probability that an individual is
wage-employed in both 1990 and 1996. All explanatory variables refer to the year 1990.
The asteriks \***" and \**" indicate marginal signi¯cance at the one percent level.
32Appendix C: descriptive statistics that refer to 1996
All W/o s-e exp. W/ s-e exp.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Tenure 5.850 5.331 5.945 5.424 3.958 2.182
Age 42.525 10.042 42.452 10.02077 43.924 10.3371
Education
8 years 0.106 | 0.109 | 0.037 |
9 years 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 |
10 years 0.050 | 0.051 | 0.026 |
12 years 0.568 | 0.568 | 0.578 |
14 years 0.028 | 0.029 | 0.017 |
16 years 0.141 | 0.139 | 0.164 |
18-20 years 0.076 | 0.072 | 0.155 |
Family status
Married 0.649 | 0.645 | 0.722 |
# of children 0.801 0.985 0.782 0.977 1.165 1.063
Geographical variables
Copenhagen 0.458 | 0.468 | 0.265 |
Rural 0.213 | 0.218 | 0.120 |
City 0.329 | 0.314 | 0.615 |
Sector
Public 0.246 | 0.256 | 0.050 |
Manufacturing 0.167 | 0.173 | 0.050 |
Energy 0.012 | 0.012 | 0.001 |
Construction 0.101 | 0.103 | 0.050 |
Retail & wholesale trade 0.208 | 0.200 | 0.352 |
Transport 0.137 | 0.129 | 0.285 |
Banking & ¯nance 0.129 | 0.125 | 0.211 |
The table describes the same variables as Table 2 in the main text but refers to 1996.
33Appendix D: full set of estimation results
Model 2
Model 1 Model 1 Initial hourly wage
IV Initial hourly wage & selection
Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value Coe®. t{value
Self-employment experience
Expse | | | | -0.082 -36.20
Expne | | | | -0.079 -107.35
Expue | | | | -0.170 -88.12
Self-employmeny dummy -0.114 -33.23 -0.085 -40.12
Tenure
Tenure 0.017 77.71 0.021 111.90 0.005 28.50
Tenure2 -0.001 -85.04 -0.001 -115.51 0.000 -41.13
Age
Age 0.016 55.25 -0.017 -62.34 -0.023 -83.61
Age2 0.000 -48.70 0.000 43.08 0.000 68.71
Education
9 years 0.007 3.40 -0.021 -11.71 -0.029 -16.04
10 years 0.009 4.75 -0.064 -38.69 -0.035 -19.36
12 years 0.078 79.59 0.022 26.90 0.019 23.30
14 years 0.121 68.17 0.093 57.79 0.106 62.49
16 years 0.275 228.02 0.143 137.62 0.153 146.59
18-20 years 0.495 334.06 0.328 236.94 0.332 235.36
Family status
Married 0.159 198.91 0.107 147.54 0.063 86.07
# of children 0.024 59.29 -0.006 -15.81 0.007 18.25
Geographical variables
Unemployment rate -0.010 -62.25 -0.007 -49.40 -0.009 -54.39
Rural -0.114 -111.63 -0.066 -71.61 -0.051 -60.15
City -0.074 -93.46 -0.023 -32.98 -0.028 -40.18
Sector
Manufacturing 0.111 108.44 0.031 31.52 0.027 26.95
Electricity 0.005 2.37 0.040 25.44 0.053 33.34
Construction -0.020 -17.58 -0.090 -84.92 -0.098 -93.90
Trade 0.138 113.17 0.052 49.17 0.039 38.53
Transport 0.071 67.22 -0.003 -3.52 -0.016 -17.82
Banking & ¯nance 0.246 197.03 0.103 101.62 0.086 83.80
Correction term 0.025 10.21 0.101 29.48
Initial hourly wage | | 0.476 386.42 0.462 368.92
Constant 4.608 723.25 3.129 406.31 3.416 420.55
Likelihood ratio tests for joint signi¯cance and adjusted R2
Test stat. Test stat. Test stat.
Speci¯cation 20,492 33,458 26,991
Experience 3,699 | 6,935
Tenure 2,359 6,671 1,799
Age 24,660 9,862 7,800
Education 27,926 13,658 13,273
Family 6,392 11,965 5,497
Geography 10,062 2,576 2,606
Sector 132 5,544 5,405
Adj. R2 0.354 0.526 0.554
# of obs. 776,841 776,841 791,049
The table displays the full set of OLS estimates for Model 1 and Model 2. Standard errors
are robust to heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly
wages. The coe±cients on the experience variables hence translate into changes in hourly
wage due to a change in experience by one year.
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